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Abstract 
 
The recent proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has intensified the debate 
on their merits. A growing literature has addressed this policy debate, focusing on the 
welfare and trade effects of RTAs and their likely impacts on the multilateral trading 
system. Some view them as stepping-stones toward multilateral trade liberalization while 
others see them as stumbling blocks against free trade. The existing literature has neglected 
some important aspects of RTAs dealing with trade in agrifood products. This study 
analyzes trade creation and diversion effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on trade of six selected agrifood products from 1985 to 2000. The investigation 
estimates an extended gravity model using pooled cross-sectional time-series regression 
and generalized least squares methods. The result shows that the share of intraregional 
trade is growing within NAFTA and that NAFTA has displaced trade with the rest of the 
world. NAFTA has served to boost trade significantly among its members rather than with 
the rest of the world. Countries participating in NAFTA have moved toward a lower degree 
of relative openness in agrifood trade with the rest of the world.  
 
Keywords: agrifood products, gravity model, NAFTA, North American Free Trade 
Agreement, regional trade agreements, trade creation, trade diversion.
  
EFFECTS OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ON TRADE  
IN AGRIFOOD PRODUCTS: EVIDENCE FROM GRAVITY MODELING  
USING DISAGGREGATED DATA 
 
 
Introduction 
The rapid spread of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has become commonplace in 
the global trading system in recent years. As a result, regionalism has emerged as a force 
potentially competing with multilateralism. The resurgence of new regionalism has 
brought back the old controversies about the welfare effects of RTAs.1 The theoretical 
literature does not provide conclusive results on the net welfare effects of RTAs. Welfare 
effects depend on the relative magnitudes of trade creation and trade diversion effects and 
it is an inherently empirical issue. Net effects of trade creation and diversion may vary 
across the commodities within the same RTA, between RTAs, and over time.  
The recent proliferation of RTAs has revived academic interest in the desirability of 
these agreements in themselves and vis-à-vis multilateral free trade. A growing literature 
addresses the debate based on the welfare effects of RTAs and their likely impacts on the 
multilateral trading system (Panagariya 2000; Krueger 1999). One school of thought views 
RTAs as reducing global welfare and creating “stumbling blocks” to multilateral free trade 
(Bhagwati 1998; Panagariya 2000). The other school of thought argues that RTAs are 
likely to raise global welfare and can act as “building blocks” to multilateral free trade 
(Summers 1991; Ethier 1998). Despite a number of empirical contributions in recent years, 
the effects of RTAs on trade in agrifood products have not been investigated rigorously. 
This void motivates our investigation, which focuses on the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and its effects on trade of agrifood products in recent history.  
The growing network of RTAs and five rounds of GATT/WTO (General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization) negotiations have served to reduce dra-
matically existing tariffs on industrial products.2 However, the same is not true for agri-
food products, as the treatment of agriculture within RTAs and the WTO is more 
complex and varies widely across agreements (Aksoy 2004). Following the Uruguay 
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Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), the treatment of agricultural trade protection 
has been slowly moving toward the way industrial products’ protection is treated.3 Yet, 
agricultural products enjoy a wide variety of exceptions incompatible with free trade, 
such as different provisions under the special safeguards, and amber-box and blue-box 
provisions of the URAA. The latter complicate agricultural trade liberalization because 
many countries rely on trade barriers to provide domestic support. Average preferential 
tariffs for agricultural products are still high in various RTAs. These conditions create a 
trading environment for agricultural products that is different from that for industrial 
goods. Some agreements, such as the Closer Economic Relations (CER) Trade Agree-
ment between Australia and New Zealand, permit free trade in agriculture. Other agree-
ments, such as NAFTA and Mercosur (the Southern Common Market), liberalize trade in 
agriculture but maintain trade barriers for sensitive products such as staples, sugar, and 
horticultural products.4 At the other extreme, the South Asian Preferential Trade Agree-
ment (SAPTA) excludes agriculture.  
Some empirical studies show that intraregional trade in agrifood products has grown 
over time (dell’Aquila, Sarker, and Meilke 1999; Vollrath 1998; Hertel, Masters, and 
Gehlhar 1999). Diao, Roe, and Somwaru (1999) show that, on average, agricultural trade 
under NAFTA, the EU-15, Mercosur, and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 
grew more rapidly than did total world agricultural trade. In particular, the growth in in-
traregional agricultural trade exceeded the growth in extraregional agricultural trade of 
the RTAs studied. These studies employ conventional descriptive statistical methods, 
which are not robust in identifying the trade effects of RTAs. While an RTA is formed to 
increase trade among members through preferential treatments, the question is whether it 
comes at the expense of the rest of the world. Despite a number of theoretical and empiri-
cal contributions in recent years, the effects of RTAs on trade in agrifood products are not 
evident in the existing literature. Most of the studies deal with merchandise trade (Claus-
ing 2001; Krueger 2000; Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora 2001). While the trading pattern for 
agrifood products differs from that of general merchandise trade, it remains an open em-
pirical question as to what extent agrifood trade among RTA partners increased and how 
much of the increase can be attributed to trade diversion.  
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Empirical studies have employed a range of techniques to investigate the effects of 
RTAs. There is a large body of empirical literature that uses economywide, multisectoral 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to analyze the welfare impacts of RTAs. 
Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) recently reviewed these studies and generated two gen-
eral conclusions: (i) RTAs increase welfare of the member countries and the rest of the 
world, and (ii) aggregate trade creation is much larger than trade diversion. Although the 
CGE models have been influential in analyzing the welfare effects, their empirical limita-
tions have been highlighted. First, the CGE studies have been prospective rather than ret-
rospective (Krueger 1999). Second, the sectoral aggregation does not allow analysis of 
specific markets (e.g., all oilseeds are bunched into one sector). Policy information is of-
ten outdated, and baseline scenarios are unrealistic and based on older data (McKitrick 
1998).5 Hence, the results of CGE studies are sometimes questionable.  
A descriptive approach is also followed in the literature to analyze the impacts of 
RTAs (Anderson and Norheim 1993; Yeats 1998; dell’Aquila, Sarker, and Meilke 1999). 
These studies use various indicators to measure the regional concentration of trade. A re-
cent study by Yeats (1998) provides empirical evidences of trade diversion in Mercosur. 
The descriptive approach implicitly assumes that the share of trade occurring with partner 
countries would not have changed in the absence of the agreement. This method depends 
on a static framework and the results are dependent on the level of aggregation. Conse-
quently, changes in the terms of trade due to changes in the relative trade importance of 
members and outsiders, as well as declines in the volume of trade for a single commodity 
included in the broader class, cannot be detected (dell’Aquila, Sarker, and Meilke 1999). 
In addition, the descriptive approach lacks the ability to analyze trade creation and diver-
sion effects and, hence, the welfare implications of RTAs. Econometric techniques have 
seldom been used to study the effects of RTAs on trade in agrifood products. In particu-
lar, empirical researchers have paid little attention to the incorporation of the effects of 
RTAs into the specification of econometric models or to the estimation of the model by 
using pre- and post-RTA agrifood data, which we include in our analysis. 
To assess the effects of NAFTA on trade in agrifood products, our investigation relies 
on a gravity model and disaggregated data. The study analyzes the effects of NAFTA on 
trade in six major agrifood commodities: red meat, grains, vegetables, fruits, sugar, and oil-
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seeds. An extended gravity model is used to determine the extent of intraregional trade bias 
and potential trade diversion effects for the six commodities separately. A pooled cross-
sectional time-series regression was estimated using the generalized least squares method 
for three-year intervals for each of the selected commodities from 1985 to 2000. The results 
suggest that NAFTA has served to boost significantly trade among its members rather than 
with the rest of the world. The results also suggest that the formation of NAFTA may have 
reduced the degree of relative openness to trade in agrifood products with the rest of the 
world. The next section will present the analytical framework with model specification and 
data description. Then we present the estimated results with a brief discussion. Finally, we 
offer concluding remarks and policy implications.  
 
Analytical Framework 
When a group of countries forms an RTA, there are two possible consequences. One 
is that higher-cost production within the union may displace lower-cost production in 
countries outside the union and divert trade from more efficient producers. The other pos-
sibility is that domestic production in one member country may be displaced by lower-
cost imports from another member country and may create new trade among members. 
Furthermore, formation of an RTA may change the relative prices of members’ imports 
and may lead to consumption expansion in the domestic market. Hence, trade creation 
can be viewed as having two composite effects: a production effect and a consumption 
effect. Since the Vinerian contribution in the 1950s, trade creation and trade diversion 
effects are being investigated in a static framework. A conceptual analysis of trade crea-
tion and diversion included in the Appendix provides more details.  
The simple three-country analytical framework, illustrated in the Appendix, has been 
used in the literature to investigate trade creation and diversion effects. This framework 
does not fully represent the real-world situation. Most RTAs, such as NAFTA, the 
European Union, and Mercosur, include more than two countries. Nevertheless, the three-
country framework is a natural starting point and an important step toward understanding 
the economics of regional integration. For ease of exposition, other partners are 
aggregated into the rest of the world. However, this framework can be extended 
empirically to many countries, including all major exporters and importers.  
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The behavioral relationships of excess demand and excess supply of countries for a 
particular commodity can be estimated by using a partial equilibrum framework. Price 
linkage equations can be specified to account for the transportation costs, exchange rate 
differences, trade policies, and so forth for a particular country. The price linkage 
equation links the domestic price to the world price. The world market equilibrium can be 
established by equating the net import demand of all the importers and net export supply 
of all the exporters. Then, the estimated excess supply and excess demand elasticities can 
be used to evaluate trade and welfare effect of RTAs (Francois and Shiells 1994; Rensik 
and Truman 1973).  
Though conceptually this approach seems feasible, empirically this is a daunting 
task. Moreover, in practice, computational and data limitations rule out such an ideal 
approach, thereby forcing a trade-off between theory and econometric analysis. Besides 
these limitations, econometric models of international trade flows have a long history of 
yielding estimates of price and substitution elasticities of demand for imports with low 
magnitude, and frequently the estimates are statistically insignificant (Prais 1962; 
Goldstein and Khan 1985).  
As an alternative, recent econometric studies have incorporated the effects of RTAs 
into the model specification and estimate models using pre-RTA and post-RTA data. The 
impact of RTAs on trade flows is captured through the use of dummy variables. This is 
known as the gravity model approach, which explains bilateral trade flows between trad-
ing partners over time. The gravity model has become an attractive technique for 
assessing the effects of RTAs. The application of the gravity model has long been con-
troversial because it often lacks a coherent theoretical foundation. Estimated results of 
empirical gravity equations suffer omitted variable bias due to the lack of a strong theo-
retical foundation (Anderson and Wincoop 2003). As a result, the estimates cannot val-
idly be used to draw comparative-static inference about the impacts of barriers on trade 
flows. This shortcoming has been addressed recently (Baier and Bergstrand 2001; Ander-
son and Wincoop 2003; and Feenstra 2002).  
Anderson (1979) provided the first theoretical explanation for the gravity equation 
based upon the properties of expenditure systems. Since Anderson’s synthesis, 
Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Deardorff (1998) have also 
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contributed to improvements of the theoretical foundation of the gravity model. In these 
studies, the gravity equation is derived theoretically as a reduced form from a general 
equilibrium model of international trade in final goods. As a result, the theoretical under-
pinnings of the gravity model have become more transparent, better understood, and 
hence widely accepted in recent years. This new legitimacy for assessing international 
trade flows motivates our reliance on an extended gravity model in this study to analyze 
the trade effects of NAFTA.  
Model Specification 
The gravity model of bilateral trade postulates that the volume of trade between two 
countries is proportional to their gross domestic products (GDP) and inversely related to 
trade barriers between them. Empirical research has generated a number of alternative 
specifications for the gravity model. In the context of international trade, the basic formu-
lation of the gravity equation is as follows: 
 3 51 2 40 ( / ) ( / )
a aa a a
ijt it jt it it jt jt ij ijtT a Y Y Y N Y N D U=  (1) 
or, using natural logarithms, 
 0 1 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln ln( / ) ln( / ) ln lnijt it jt it it jt jt ij ijtT a a Y a Y a Y N a Y N a D U= + + + + + +  (2) 
where 
Tijt = total bilateral trade between country i to country j in year t; 
Ynt = income of country n in year t and n = i,j; 
Nnt = population of country n in year t and n = i,j; 
Dij = distance between countries i and j; 
Uijt = log normal error term. 
By introducing regional dummy variables to estimate appropriate trade effects for 
NAFTA into equation (2), the basic formulation of the model can be extended as follows: 
 
0 1 1 2 2 3 4 5
6 7 1 2
ln ln ln ln ln
 ln ln  
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ijt t t it jt it
jt ij ij ij ijt
T a a D a D a GDP a GDP a GDPPC
a GDPPC a DIST NAFTA NAFTAO U i j
i j n
+ += + + + + +
+ + + α + α + ∀ <
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 (3) 
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where  
NAFTA = 1 if j is a member of NAFTA 
 = 0 otherwise 
NAFTAO = 1 if i is a net importer from a nonmember j 
 = 0 otherwise 
In equation (3), Tijt is the current U.S. dollar value of total bilateral trade (exports plus 
imports) between country i and country j in year t, Dt+1 and Dt+2 are dummies for the sec-
ond year and third year, respectively (the first year is subsumed into the intercept). GDPit 
and GDPjt are nominal gross domestic products of country i and country j in year t in 
U.S. dollars, respectively, GDPPCit and GDPPCjt are nominal per capita GDP of country 
i and country j in year t in U.S. dollars, respectively. The latter variables are obtained by 
dividing GDP by midyear population (N) of the respective countries. Variable DISTij is 
the direct air distance in kilometers between the capitals of country i and country j. The 
remaining variables included in equation (3) are dummy variables designed to capture the 
influence of other factors on trade flows.  
Following Frankel and Wei (1998), we define two dummy variables for each re-
gional bloc: (i) regional bloc dummy and (ii) an openness dummy. For example, NAFTAij 
represents the existence of regional trade agreements between country i and country j in 
equation (3). If the estimated coefficient of the regional bloc dummy is positive and sta-
tistically significant in a particular estimation period, it implies that the intraregional 
trade has been stimulated by the formation of NAFTA. The estimated coefficient indi-
cates that how much more trade had taken place among NAFTA members as a result of 
the formation of NAFTA. This reflects the sum of trade creation and trade diversion for 
NAFTA (e.g., Aitken 1973; Endoh 1999)  
The NAFTAOij dummy captures the degree of openness of NAFTA members' im-
ports from the rest of the world. This dummy variable takes the value of one if a member 
is a net importer from the rest of the world (the importer is a member of NAFTA while 
the exporter is not in NAFTA) and zero otherwise. These dummy variables reflect any 
trade diversion occurring in the respective NAFTA member’s import structure. If the co-
efficients of these variables are negative and statistically significant, then it can be stated 
that the total trade of the member (in the market where it is a net importer) with the rest 
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of the world is less than relative to its net exports to a nonmember. More broadly, it im-
plies that an RTA member has reduced its net imports from the rest of the world relative 
to its net exports to the rest of the world (Eichengreen and Irwin 1998; Frankel 1997). By 
combining the effects of the two dummy variables, we are able to separate cases where 
NAFTA is trade creating only (that is, it caused intrabloc trade to increase above average 
levels without changes in openness to nonmembers’ trade) from those where NAFTA’s 
increase in intrabloc trade comes at the expense of nonmembers’ exports to the bloc 
countries. The latter effect can be identified as trade diversion.  
Because of the double-logarithmic specification of the estimated function, the pa-
rameter estimates on the GDPi, GDPj, GDPPCi, GDPPCj, and distance variable can be 
interpreted as elasticities. For example, in equation (3), a3 represents the percentage 
change in Tij induced by a 1 percent change in GDPi holding per capita GDP constant.6 
As dummy variables cannot be expressed in log form, the parameter estimates (αk and βk) 
should be interpreted with care. The percentage effect of the dummy variable is calcu-
lated following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980).7 Hence, for example, assume that the 
coefficient estimate of the NAFTA dummy variable in equation (3) is α1. This shows that 
two NAFTA members traded an extra {exp(α1)-1}*100 percent relative to the amount 
they traded with a non-NAFTA country. More precisely, the mean (or average) trade be-
tween two members is higher than their mean trade with the rest of the world by 
{exp(α1)-1}*100 percent. Note that the benchmark is when a member country trades with 
a nonmember country (one bilateral partner is in the rest of the world). Similarly, the 
NAFTAO parameters (α2) should be interpreted with care. For example, assuming that α2 
is negative, total trade of a NAFTA member (where the NAFTA member is a net im-
porter) with a non-NAFTA country is {exp(-α2 )-1}*100 percent less than its net exports 
to nonmember.8  
In the regression equation (3), expectations of the estimated sign for the explanatory 
variables are as follows. First, GDPi and GDPj would have positive coefficients because 
of the direct relationship between GDP and import demand. Moreover, we presume that 
larger economies trade more than do smaller economies. Similarly, GDPPCi and GDPPCj 
would possess a positive coefficient for normal final goods, as higher per capita income 
would induce higher import demand. Moreover, for a given size of the economy, as coun-
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tries become more developed, they tend to specialize more in production and trade. In 
turn, richer economies tend to trade more than poorer economies. The GDP can be 
thought of as capturing the importance of size of the total economy or income as a deter-
minant of trade, and the GDP per capita can be thought of as capturing the effects of the 
wealth of the economy on trade (Frankel and Wei 1998, Frankel 1997; Gilbert, Scollay, 
and Bora 2001).  
The coefficients for DISTij would likely have a negative sign, given that greater dis-
tances tend to increase transportation costs and information costs.9 One would expect the 
estimated coefficient on the distance variable to be diminished in magnitude over the es-
timation period because of the recent developments in transportation technology. Frankel 
(1997) measured the distance by air routes in his study whereas Bikker (1987) measured 
distance by sea routes. Both of these studies report the estimated effect of distance on bi-
lateral trade as negative and diminishing in magnitude over time. They also find a small 
though statistically significant difference in coefficient between the two.   
Data Description 
We concentrate on NAFTA from 1985 to 2000.10 We selected this period to track the 
evolution of the trade pattern of NAFTA and to maintain comparability of the estimated 
coefficients. As its signatories implemented NAFTA in 1994, a comparison between pre-
NAFTA and post-NAFTA econometric estimates will generate useful information about 
the trade effects of NAFTA. Hence we mainly focus on the magnitude and changes in 
estimated coefficients over the selected period. This study uses the International Trade by 
Commodities Statistics (ITCS) database developed by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2002). The ITCS provides yearly statistical data 
on imports and exports in quantity and value (thousand U.S. dollars) by commodities and 
by partner countries.11 The ITCS, in its fullest detail, presents 2,582 different products 
that are classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification system 
(SITC-Revision 3).  
In the present work, agrifood commodities are classified under six different catego-
ries according to the ITCS database. They are red meat, grains, vegetables, fruits, sugar, 
and oilseeds. Table 1 gives a complete description of the six commodities, with respec-
tive SITC codes. In each category, the study uses annual total bilateral trade (exports plus  
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TABLE 1. Description of commodities 
Commodity SITC Codes and Description  
Red meat 0111: Meat of bovine animals, fresh, chilled, or frozen 
0112: Meat of sheep and goats, fresh, chilled, or frozen 
0113: Meat of swine, fresh, chilled, or frozen 
 
Grains 041: Wheat 
042: Rice 
043: Barley 
044: Maize 
045: Cereals (no wheat, rice, barley, or maize) 
 
Vegetables 054: Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen/preserved; roots, tubers 
056: Vegetables, roots and tubers, prepared/preserved, n.e.s. 
 
Fruits 057: Fruits and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 
058: Fruit, preserved, and fruit preparations 
 
Sugar 06: Sugar, sugar preparations 
 
Oilseeds 222 + 223: Ground nuts, Soya beans, Cotton seeds, Sunflower 
seeds, Sesame seeds, Rape, Colza, Mustard seeds, Linseeds, 
Palm nuts, Castor oilseeds 
 
 
imports) for 59 countries, so that there are 1,711 data points (59*58/2) for a given year. 
The sample of countries accounts for at least 75 percent of world trade in a given year 
during the study period. GDP and per capita GDP data in current thousand U.S. dollars 
are taken from the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) (2003). The distance data is from the World Distance Tables produced by 
Hengeveld (1996). This database gives the direct air distance in kilometers between the 
capitals of selected countries. 
 
Estimated Results 
A pooled time-series, cross-section regression is estimated for three-year intervals 
from 1985 to 2000 for each of the six agrifood commodities.12 The pooled data set allows 
better estimation of the influence of NAFTA when there are limited observations in each 
cross-section. For example, the NAFTA bloc dummy takes the value of one for only two 
bilateral pairs and takes the value of zero for the remaining 57 pairs per year. Notice that 
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having this few observations may lead to an imprecise estimate of the NAFTA bloc ef-
fect, i.e., with a large standard error. Hence, we pooled data in three-year increments dur-
ing the 15-year period, from 1985 to 2000 and estimate five separate regressions for each 
product. We also added time dummies for two of the three years (the third is, of course, 
rolled into the constant) to minimize the distortion of inflation on the estimates.13 The 
year-specific intercept terms absorb the effects of global inflation and growth.  
This dataset exhibits heteroskedastic error, as is frequently the case with cross-
sectional data, based on the Breusch-Pagan and the White tests. Hence, generalized least 
squares are used to account for heteroskedasticity. We obtained the transformed variables 
in equation (3) by weighting each observation by the inverse of the square root of pre-
dicted squared residuals. The idea is that less weight is given to observations with a 
higher error variance.  
Tables 2 through 7 report the estimated results for the selected commodities traded 
by NAFTA members. First we discuss standard gravity variables before turning to the 
bloc effects. The adjusted R2 ranges from 0.4 for oilseeds to 0.7 for grains. The log of the 
two country GDP coefficients is always highly significant at the 1 percent level. These 
coefficients possess the expected positive sign in all estimated equations. In most cases, 
they are also less than 1. The estimated coefficients of GDPi and GDPj vary from 0.2 to 
0.9 during the study period.14 Hence, the result indicates that there is a statistically sig-
nificant positive relationship between bilateral trade and incomes of partners. But trade 
increases less than proportionately with a country’s size when per capita GDP is constant. 
This shows that large countries trade more than do small ones in the six commodities. 
These estimates are consistent with other studies such as Frankel (1997), Frankel and Wei 
(1998), and Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora (2001).  
The parameter estimates of per capita income of NAFTA members and nonmembers 
on red meat trade are positive and statistically significant during the period of the study. 
They are also generally more than one for members and less than one for nonmembers. 
Hence, red meat trade increases more than proportionately with a member country’s per 
capita income and less than proportionately with a nonmember country’s per capita in-
come. However, for the rest of the commodities, the per capita income coefficient shows 
mixed sign and magnitude. Hence, a general conclusion cannot be deduced. The  
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TABLE 2. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in red meat (1985-2000) 
 85-87  88-90  91-93  95-97  98-
2000 
          
Intercept -40.65  -37.02  -31.44  -30.79  -23.33 
 (-9.67)  (-6.44)  (-8.31)  (-10.25)  (-7.75)
          
Dt+1 0.02  -0.10  0.19  -0.45  -0.07 
(Year dummy 1) (0.05)  (-0.28)  (0.55)  (-1.38)  (-0.20)
          
Dt+2 0.12  -0.22  -0.01  -0.02  0.09 
(Year dummy 2) (0.35)  (-0.63)  (-0.03)  (-0.07)  (0.28)
          
GDPi 0.97  0.93  1.08  0.82  0.79 
(Gross domestic prod-
uct of i) 
(6.40)  (6.36)  (7.51)  (5.84)  (5.24)
          
GDPj 0.35  0.10  0.33  0.32  0.28 
(Gross domestic prod-
uct of j) 
(3.56)  (0.97)  (2.79)  (3.23)  (2.61)
          
GDPPCi 1.40  1.24  1.10  1.13  0.63 
(Per capita GDP of i) (4.04)  (3.43)  (3.02)  (4.33)  (2.12)
          
GDPPCj 0.93  0.91  0.45  0.50  0.49 
(Per capita GDP of j) (7.92)  (6.76)  (2.98)  (4.00)  (3.36)
          
DIST 0.01  0.34  -0.61  -0.06  -0.21 
(Distance) (0.02)  (1.12)  (-2.09)  (-0.19)  (-0.77)
          
NAFTA 1.78  2.91  2.45  3.07  3.76 
(Regional dummy) (3.37)  (5.22)  (3.72)  (5.19)  (7.65)
          
NAFTAO 1.91  1.92  2.10  0.60  0.56 
(Openness dummy) (6.12)  (6.14)  (6.46)  (2.00)  (1.50)
          
Adjusted R2 0.55  0.49  0.44  0.48  0.36 
Observations 243  229  309  343  357 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
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TABLE 3. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in grains (1985-2000) 
 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000 
      
Intercept -22.39 -21.73 -26.08 -16.69 -12.98 
 (-5.430) (-6.85) (-13.86) (-10.21) (-8.14) 
      
Dt+1 -0.09 -0.04 0.24 -0.04 -0.17 
(Year dummy 1) (-0.26) (-0.15) (1.00) (-0.17) (-0.80) 
      
Dt+2 -0.08 -0.13 0.04 -0.03 -0.31 
(Year dummy 2) (-0.25) (-0.57) (0.16) (-0.12) (-1.50) 
      
GDPi 0.82 0.78 0.62 0.58 0.44 
(Gross domestic product of i) (5.83) (7.75) (7.63) (6.93) (5.42) 
      
GDPj 0.76 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.92 
(Gross domestic product of j) (7.83) (9.29) 11.58 11.11 11.89 
      
GDPPCi 1.34 1.30 2.12 1.41 1.44 
(Per capita GDP of i) (3.18) (4.46) (9.03) (7.91) (8.01) 
      
GDPPCj -0.42 -0.53 -0.47 -0.47 -0.48 
(Per capita GDP of j) (-3.77) (-5.60) (-5.94) (-4.33) (-5.55) 
      
DIST -0.94 -0.74 -1.01 -1.23 -1.52 
(Distance) (-3.80) (-3.70) (-4.89) (-7.28) (-10.50) 
      
NAFTA -0.30 -0.10 0.51 0.61 0.34 
(Regional dummy) (-0.54) (-0.14) (1.43) (1.95) (1.28) 
      
NAFTAO -0.72 -0.87 -0.49 -1.18 -1.11 
(Openness dummy) (-1.84) (-2.74) (-1.58) (-3.85) (-4.95) 
      
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.61 
Observations 234 238 405 421 437 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
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TABLE 4. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in vegetables (1985-
2000) 
 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000 
      
Intercept -15.44 -15.81 -23.57 -8.54 -8.10 
 (-5.91) (-4.62) (-11.28) (-5.41) (-4.63) 
      
Dt+1 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.25 0.01 
(Year dummy 1) (-0.49) (-0.22) (-0.160 (-1.30) (0.06) 
      
Dt+2 -0.20 -0.18 -0.23 -0.37 -0.29 
(Year dummy 2) (-0.79) (-0.66) (-0.99) (-1.95) (-1.69) 
      
GDPi 0.60 0.81 0.61 0.26 0.19 
(Gross domestic product 
of i) 
(6.42) (8.34) (6.52) (3.28) (2.45) 
      
GDPj 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.83 0.85 
(Gross domestic product 
of j) 
(12.98) (12.24) (14.67) (16.32) (17.49) 
      
GDPPCi 1.04 0.61 1.63 1.37 1.32 
(Per capita GDP of i) (4.07) (2.18) (8.05) (9.43) (9.28) 
      
GDPPCj -0.07 -0.17 -0.18 -0.21 -0.38 
(Per capita GDP of j) (-0.80) (-1.78) (-1.97) (-2.76) (-6.08) 
      
DIST -1.59 -1.49 -1.27 -1.73 -1.42 
(Distance) (-8.17) (-6.53) (-6.56) (-11.92) (-10.52) 
      
NAFTA 0.10 0.61 1.22 0.85 1.26 
(Regional dummy) (0.31) (1.58) (3.68) (2.80) (4.10) 
      
NAFTAO 0.78 0.87 0.39 0.35 0.23 
(Openness dummy) (4.39) (4.21) (1.85) (2.09) (1.40) 
      
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.6 
Observations 240 237 399 438 446 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
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TABLE 5. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in fruits (1985-2000) 
 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000
      
Intercept -26.35 -30.06 -35.82 -20.11 -18.30 
 (-8.74) (-9.31) (-17.27) (-11.45) (-10.19)
      
Dt+1 0.08 -0.12 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 
(Year dummy 1) (0.32) (-0.44) (0.02) (-0.45) (-0.62)
      
Dt+2 0.01 -0.06 -0.17 -0.07 -0.06 
(Year dummy 2) (0.02) (-0.20) (-0.71) (-0.33) (-0.24)
      
GDPi 0.91 1.15 1.04 1.12 1.06 
(Gross domestic 
product of i) 
(7.27) (9.60) (10.22) (10.51) (9.11)
      
GDPj 0.59 0.66 0.75 0.69 0.90 
(Gross domestic 
product of j) 
(6.08) (6.83) (11.52) (11.17) (14.45)
      
GDPPCi 0.92 0.55 1.42 0.41 0.48 
(Per capita GDP of i) (3.93) (2.54) (6.53) (1.99) (2.17)
      
GDPPCj 0.15 0.13 -0.01 0.09 -0.07 
(Per capita GDP of j) (1.33) (1.09) (-0.14) (0.94) (-0.82)
      
DIST -0.58 -0.50 -0.65 -1.45 -1.90 
(Distance) (-2.37) (-2.14) (-3.50) (-8.36) (-10.33)
      
NAFTA 0.64 1.06 0.82 0.39 -0.20 
(Regional dummy) (1.64) (2.93) (2.30) (1.26) (-0.58)
      
NAFTAO 1.18 1.52 1.84 1.34 1.16 
(Openness dummy) (3.89) (4.64) (7.26) (5.66) (4.71)
      
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.57 0.62 0.56 0.54 
Observations 235 240 394 419 435 
Note: t statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
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TABLE 6. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in sugar (1985-2000) 
 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000 
      
Intercept -7.53 -7.66 -14.65 -7.25 -5.42 
 (-2.35) (-1.96) (-6.55) (-3.78) (-2.56) 
      
Dt+1 0.01 -0.04 -0.31 0.32 -0.42 
(Year dummy 1) (0.03) (-0.13) (-1.07) (1.30) (-1.60) 
      
Dt+2 -0.13 -0.05 -0.30 0.34 -0.39 
(Year dummy 2) (-0.45) (-0.13) (-1.06) (1.45) (-1.57) 
      
GDPi 1.03 0.99 1.39 1.13 1.04 
(Gross domestic product of 
i) 
(8.30) (7.03) (11.51) (10.38) (9.40) 
      
GDPj 0.52 0.51 0.69 0.66 0.63 
(Gross domestic product of 
j) 
(6.46) (5.54) (7.97) (9.23) (9.12) 
      
GDPPCi -0.38 -0.44 -0.18 -0.65 -0.58 
(Per capita GDP of i) (-1.33) (-1.33) (-0.76) (-3.49) (-2.76) 
      
GDPPCj 0.07 0.11 -0.14 -0.19 -0.17 
(Per capita GDP of j) (0.51) (0.81) (-1.30) (-1.86) (-1.70) 
      
DIST -1.51 -1.40 -2.00 -1.59 -1.57 
(Distance) (-5.24) (-4.13) (-9.01) (-8.74) (-9.27) 
      
NAFTA -1.47 -0.56 -0.45 0.16 0.51 
(Regional dummy) (-2.26) (-0.87) (-1.00) (0.59) (1.79) 
      
NAFTAO 1.32 1.11 0.60 0.83 0.74 
(Openness dummy) (4.34) (2.82) (2.12) (2.90) (2.79) 
      
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.4 
Observations 227 232 377 449 436 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
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TABLE 7. Gravity model regression results of NAFTA trade in oilseeds (1985-2000) 
 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000 
      
Intercept -24.54 -30.93 -27.91 -32.47 -5.42 
 (-6.09) (-7.58) (-7.59) (-12.09) (-2.56) 
      
Dt+1 -0.04 -0.38 0.30 -0.15 -0.42 
(Year dummy 1) (-0.10) (-1.15) (1.09) (-0.52) (-1.60) 
      
Dt+2 -0.08 -0.60 0.20 0.02 -0.39 
(Year dummy 2) (-0.21) (-1.71) (0.67) (0.06) (-1.57) 
      
GDPi 1.14 1.29 1.24 0.89 1.04 
(Gross domestic product 
of i) 
(6.53) (8.67) (10.15) (7.95) (9.40) 
      
GDPj 0.94 0.86 0.94 1.15 0.63 
(Gross domestic product 
of j) 
(8.22) (8.62) (11.35) (13.97) (9.12) 
      
GDPPCi 0.34 0.23 -0.01 0.86 -0.58 
(Per capita GDP of i) (0.96) (0.88) (-0.05) (3.92) (-2.76) 
      
GDPPCj 0.10 0.08 0.05 -0.13 -0.17 
(Per capita GDP of j) (0.59) (0.57) (0.44) (-1.27) (-1.7) 
      
DIST -1.45 -0.85 -1.03 -0.86 -1.57 
(Distance) (-4.75) (-2.63) (-4.00) (-3.38) (-9.27) 
      
NAFTA 0.52 1.27 1.06 1.70 0.51 
(Regional dummy) (0.48) (1.41) (1.72) (2.69) (1.79) 
      
NAFTAO -0.67 -0.08 0.87 0.45 0.74 
(Openness dummy) (-1.33) (-0.18) (2.78) (1.64) (2.79) 
      
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.5 0.49 0.57 0.4 
Observations 220 243 329 350 436 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables except dummy variables are in logs. The dependant vari-
able is total trade between country pairs.  
 
estimated coefficients for GDPPCi and GDPPCj can take either a positive or a negative sign. 
Commodities are revealed to be normal goods in consumption when the response of imports 
to per capita GDP is estimated to be positive and vice versa for inferior commodities.  
Bilateral distance has a large effect on NAFTA trade. As expected, the parameter es-
timates of the distance variable are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in NAFTA during the study period irrespective of the products. The negative sign 
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on the distance parameter indicates that trade diminishes as distance increases. Note, 
however, that the elasticity estimates vary considerably across commodities and for the 
same commodity over time.  
We use the log of air distance between the two major cities of the respective coun-
tries as the proximity measure.15 The cities are usually the capitals of the two countries. 
But we substitute the capital for a major city in a few cases, as the major city seems to be 
the country’s economic center.16 For example, we use Shanghai for China rather than 
Beijing. We presume, as have many other studies on gravity, that the direct air distance is 
a reasonable proxy for transportation cost. However, it should be noted that transportation 
cost will not always increase monotonically with distance because transaction costs asso-
ciated with many operations, such as loading, storage, and local distribution, are large 
compared with the small marginal cost per kilometer of distance traveled (Frankel 1997).  
Our estimates for the effect of distance on bilateral trade in agrifood products con-
firm findings by Bikker (1987) and Boisso and Ferrantino (1994), who concentrated on 
total aggregated trade rather than on disaggregated products. Indeed, our distance coeffi-
cients seem to take a wider range for the six commodities. In general, we expect a higher 
distance effect for agricultural products than for manufactures, as agricultural products 
are relatively bulkier and perishable. Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1994) show that the nega-
tive effect of distance is more evident for agriculture than for manufactured products.17 
One might expect the distance effect to decline over time, as the average cost of transpor-
tation per kilometer has undoubtedly declined as a consequence of improved technology. 
But, there is no observable trend in the distance coefficient of NAFTA across the com-
modities during the entire sample period.  
NAFTA Bloc Effect 
Empirical results reported in Tables 2 through 7 suggest that there is a significant 
positive NAFTA bloc effect on vegetables and red meat trade during the study period. 
The calculated percentage change and dollar value equivalents of the estimated bloc and 
openness coefficients of NAFTA for the selected commodities are reported in Table 8.18 
In vegetable trade, the estimated coefficient of NAFTA is 0.1 (statistically insignificant) 
during 1985-87, rising to 1.26 (statistically significant) during 1998-2000. Beginning in 
1991-93, it becomes more than one and statistically significant. This suggests that after 
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TABLE 8. Calculated percentage change and U.S. dollar (thousand) equivalents in 
the respective estimated bloc and openness coefficients of NAFTA (1985-2000) 
Product Variable 85-87 88-90 91-93 95-97 98-2000        
Red meat NAFTA  
493* 
(185618) 
1736*** 
(907532) 
1059** 
(696563) 
2054*** 
(1431274) 
4195*** 
(3293411) 
 
NAFTAO 
 
575*** 
(216491) 
582*** 
(304253) 
717*** 
(471610) 
82** 
(55745) 
75 
(58881) 
       
Vegetables 
 
NAFTA 11 
(2174) 
84 
(24201) 
239** 
(73179) 
134** 
(52870) 
253** 
(120968) 
 
NAFTAO 118** 
(23329) 
139** 
(40047) 
48* 
(14697) 
42** 
(16571) 
26 
(12431) 
       
Grains 
 
NAFTA 
 
-26 
(16979) 
-10 
(9607) 
67 
(53218) 
84* 
(97738) 
40 
(36990) 
 
NAFTAO 
 
-51* 
(33305) 
-58** 
(55721) 
-39 
(30978) 
-69** 
(80285) 
-67*** 
(61959) 
       
Sugar 
 
NAFTA 
 
-77** 
(9521) 
-43 
(6433) 
-36 
(5266) 
17 
(3210) 
67* 
(11662) 
 
NAFTAO 
 
274** 
(33882) 
203** 
(30370) 
82** 
(11996) 
129** 
(24365) 
110** 
(19146) 
       
Fruits 
 
NAFTA 
 
90 
(43685) 
189** 
(119160) 
127** 
(79984) 
48 
(33076) 
-18 
(13370) 
 
NAFTAO 
 
225** 
(109213) 
357** 
(225080) 
530*** 
(333791) 
282*** 
(194324) 
219** 
(162679) 
       
Oilseeds 
NAFTA 
 
68 
(25324) 
256 
(98618) 
189 
(74260) 
447** 
(261261) 
67* 
(33034) 
 
NAFTAO 
 
-49 
(18248) 
-8 
(3081) 
139** 
(54615) 
57 
(33315) 
110** 
(54235) 
Note: The estimated coefficients are reported in Tables 2 through 7 and corresponding percentage effects 
are shown here. The percentage effect is calculated by subtracting one from the exponent of the regression 
coefficient and then multiplying the result by 100. Generated thousand U.S. dollar equivalents are in paren-
theses.  
*** denotes significant at the 1% level based on the estimated coefficients; 
** denotes significant at the 5% level based on the estimated coefficients; 
* denotes significant at the 10% level based on the estimated coefficients.  
 
the NAFTA agreement, the regional trade bias for vegetables has increased. The esti-
mates suggest that during the 1985-87 period, two members of NAFTA traded vegetables 
11 percent (=exp(0.10)-1) more on average than they traded with the rest of the world. 
This increased substantially to 253 percent (exp(1.26)-1=2.53) during the 1998-2000 pe-
riod. During the 15-year period, intra-NAFTA vegetable trade increased from U.S.$2 
million to U.S.$120 million. This possibly reflects the effects of Mexican entry into 
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NAFTA in 1994. Mexico is a net exporter of vegetables and enjoys preferential access to 
larger Canadian and U.S. markets.  
In red meat trade, the coefficient of NAFTA is positive and statistically significant 
during the entire period of this study. Interestingly, the red meat dummy has the most 
significant coefficients with larger magnitudes. The estimated coefficient is 1.78 during 
1985-87 and is increasing up to 3.76 in 1998-2000. Red meat trade between NAFTA 
members ranges from 4 times to a staggering 42 times higher than it would otherwise be 
with the rest of the world. In terms of dollars, red meat trade among NAFTA members 
increased from U.S.$185 million to U.S.$3.3 billion during the study period. The bias is 
clearly significant even prior to the implementation of NAFTA in 1994.  
In the case of grains, the estimated coefficient is -0.3 and statistically insignificant 
during the 1985-87 period (Table 3). It becomes 0.34 (but statistically insignificant) dur-
ing the 1998-2000 period. However, only during the 1995-1997 period is it statistically 
significant, at 0.61. As indicated in Table 8, two NAFTA members traded 26 percent less 
than they traded with the rest of the world during 1985-87. But during 1998-2000, they 
traded with each other 40 percent (U.S.$36 million) more than they traded with the rest of 
the world. Hence, there is a clear upward trend in the bloc effect, even in trading grains. 
The coefficient for sugar trade increases from –1.47 (statistically significant) during 
1985-87 to 0.51 (statistically significant) during 1998-2000. It turns out that two mem-
bers of NAFTA traded sugar 77 percent less than they traded with the rest of the world 
during 1985-87 (U.S.$9.5 million), but they traded 67 percent (U.S.$11 million) more 
sugar relative to what they traded with the rest of the world during 1998-2000. Though 
not all coefficients are statistically significant, there is weak evidence of an intraregional 
trade bias for the grains and sugar in NAFTA.  
In the case of oilseed trade, although estimates are positive and quite large, ranging 
from 0.57 to 1.7, except for the 1995-97 period, none is statistically significant. There is 
no clear trend in the estimated coefficients on oilseeds during the study period. In the 
case of trade in fruits, the NAFTA bloc effect is significant only during the 1988-90 and 
1991-93 periods. Since the formation of NAFTA, this coefficient declines and even be-
comes negative during 1998-2000. Therefore, we cannot identify a strong bloc effect on 
oilseed and fruit trade.  
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We have seen that the relative magnitudes and trends of the estimated bloc effects 
are different for different commodities. Looking at explicit product categories, evidence 
of a significant regional trade bias is not found for oilseeds and fruits. However, in red 
meat and vegetable trade, a significant positive bloc effect is found during the sample pe-
riod. The bias is strongest in red meat trade. We also find a positive bloc effect for grains 
and sugar. Thus, there is evidence to support that NAFTA has been successful in promot-
ing trade in red meat, vegetables, sugar, and grains among its members. Can this success 
be attributed partially to trade diversion effects of NAFTA? We turn to this question in 
the following section.  
Trade-Diverting Effects of NAFTA 
Observing the level of changes in the degree of NAFTAO, the openness dummy, can 
give insights into the presence of trade diversion effects. This will tell us whether there 
are reductions in the level of imports by NAFTA members from nonmembers relative to 
the level of exports by NAFTA members to nonmembers over time. We are interested in 
both the level of the openness coefficient and its changes over time (i.e., during the pre- 
and post-NAFTA periods). The relevant results are reported in Tables 2 through 7. Table 
8 presents calculated percentage changes and their dollar equivalents. 
The estimated coefficients of red meat, vegetables, fruits, and sugar are positive and 
statistically significant but diminishing over time. The coefficients for red meat and vege-
tables become statistically insignificant, however, during the 1998-2000 period. There is 
a significant change in the openness coefficient for red meat, vegetables, fruits, and sugar 
after 1994 (post-NAFTA period). This reflects the effects of discriminatory preferential 
trade policies adopted by the NAFTA members after 1994.  
The openness coefficient for red meat declines from 1.91 during 1985-87 to 0.56 
during 1998-2000. Note that it increased from 1.91 in 1985-87 to 2.1 in 1990-93. After 
1994, it declined to 0.6 and continues to drop even further. During 1985-87, net red meat 
imports of a country that later became a NAFTA member from the rest of the world was 
about six times (=exp (1.91)-1 =5.75) more relative to its net exports to a nonmember. 
However, during 1998-2000, net imports of a NAFTA partner from the rest of the world 
declined to only 0.75 times more (= exp(0.56) –1) relative to its net exports to a non-
member. In monetary terms, the NAFTA imports of red meat from the rest of the world 
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relative to its exports of the same commodity have decreased from U.S.$225 million dur-
ing 1985-87 to U.S.$58 million during 1998-2000.  
In the case of vegetable trade, a similar pattern can be observed. The estimated open-
ness coefficient declines from 0.78 during 1985-87 to 0.23 during 1998-2000. Once 
again, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient declines significantly after 1994. More 
precisely, total vegetable imports of a NAFTA member from the rest of the world (where 
the NAFTA member is a net importer) declined from U.S.$23 million to U.S.$12 million.  
The openness coefficient for sugar fell from 1.32 during 1985-87 to 0.74 during the 
1998-2000 period. The openness coefficient for fruits increased from 1.18 in 1985-87 to 
1.84 in 1990-93, and then declined to 1.16 in 1998-2000. This indicates that, since the 
formation of NAFTA, members are importing relatively less fruits from nonmembers. 
Hence, the economies of NAFTA are becoming relatively less open to trade in red meat, 
vegetables, fruits, and sugar with the rest of the world over time. In particular, there is a 
significant reduction in trade (where a member is a net importer) after the 1994 period of 
the study.  
In the case of trade in grains, the estimated openness coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant but increasing in absolute value after formation of NAFTA. The 
results show that NAFTA members imported 39 percent (or U.S.$ 30 million) less grains 
from the rest of the world during the 1991-93 period, and this declined even further to 67 
percent (or U.S.$61 million) during 1998-2000. There is clear evidence of trade diversion 
in grains under NAFTA. This result reflects the fact that Mexico is the only NAFTA 
member importing a significant amount of grains. The other two members are net export-
ers of grains. Since 1994, Mexico is importing more grains from the United States and 
Canada than from other countries. The latter countries are competitive exporters while 
Mexican grain markets have been protected, especially coarse grains. Hence, the avail-
ability of cheaper imports from Canada and the United States does not constitute diver-
sion in the Vinerian sense of importing from a less competitive source. The estimated 
openness coefficients for oilseed trade are negative but statistically insignificant during 
the first two periods. However, they become increasingly open since the formation of 
NAFTA in 1994. 
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Though the estimated coefficients of red meat, vegetables, sugar, and fruits are posi-
tive, they show a clear downward trend during the study period. The declining trend is 
very pronounced after formation of NAFTA in 1994. The results show that NAFTA 
members are becoming less open to trade in red meat, vegetables, sugar, grains (with the 
caveat) and fruits with the rest of the world. Only in case of oilseed trade does empirical 
evidence suggest that NAFTA members are becoming more open to trade with the rest of 
the world relative to NAFTA members. 
Frankel (1997) applied the gravity model to total bilateral trade of NAFTA. Similarly, 
Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora (2001) and Krueger (2000) estimated the gravity model for non-
fuel trade of NAFTA. These studies show that, in general, NAFTA tends to increase its 
openness to nonmembers’ trade while increasing trade among its member countries. While 
the commodities considered in this study are different from those in previous studies, the 
results suggest that for five of the six commodities, NAFTA may have contributed to de-
clining openness to trade with nonmembers relative to trade with members.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
We analyzed the effects of NAFTA on trade in six agrifood commodities for the pe-
riod 1985-2000. The results suggest that there has been a significant increase in red meat, 
vegetables, grains, and sugar trade among the NAFTA members during the study period. 
A greater intraregional trade bias was found for red meat and vegetables than for the 
other commodities. NAFTA countries traded more with each other than they traded with 
a nonmember (either because the reduction of intra-NAFTA tariffs has created new trade 
or because trade has been diverted from the rest of the world to intra-NAFTA channels). 
While this study does not provide the precise magnitude of these effects, it provides in-
sights into the presence of trade creation and trade diversion effects.  
While red meat, vegetable, grain, and sugar trade have been reorienting significantly 
among members after the NAFTA agreement in 1994, the members seem to have reduced 
their imports from the rest of the world. The estimated coefficient of the openness 
dummy indicates that there is a decrease in red meat, vegetable, grain, sugar, and fruit 
imports by NAFTA members from the rest of the world since the formation of this re-
gional agreement. This indicates that NAFTA preferential trade policies promote trade 
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among members vigorously, while displacing trade with nonmember countries. Interest-
ingly, NAFTA members seem to have traded more oilseeds with the rest of the world 
than with other members. 
We investigated the extent to which NAFTA’s preferential policies are influencing 
bilateral trade patterns for the six agrifood commodities, holding other economic deter-
minants constant. The results suggest that intraregional trade of NAFTA was greater dur-
ing the study period than what natural determinants can explain, i.e., the proximity of a 
pair of countries, their size, and the per capita GDP. The share of intraregional trade is 
growing within NAFTA. This does not necessarily mean that the members of NAFTA are 
undertaking explicit discriminatory trade policy measures against the rest of the world. 
This could be due to natural factors, e.g., rapid growth in per capita GDPs. However, the 
empirical results suggest that this has not been the case for NAFTA.  
The major findings of the study are that NAFTA has reduced the degree of relative 
openness to trade in agrifood products with the rest of the world. NAFTA has served to 
boost trade significantly among its members rather than with the rest of the world. While 
this study does not generate specific information regarding the extent of trade creation 
and trade diversion for the six commodities attributable to NAFTA, the results do suggest 
the presence of significant trade creation and diversion effects. The empirical findings of 
this study can be considered as an intermediate step for addressing the relative trade crea-
tion and diversion effects. The results are informative and useful in identifying trade crea-
tion and trade diversion effects of NAFTA on the major agrifood products. Also, the 
study signifies the importance of analyzing the effects of RTAs for major commodities. 
The results based on aggregate data may not be revealing because the trade effects of an 
RTA may vary across agrifood commodities. This study is also helpful in identifying the 
existence of commodity-specific differences in agrifood trade patterns under NAFTA.  
Although the research does provide valuable information for the agrifood sector, it 
does possess a number of limitations. We have not incorporated bilateral trade among 
nonmembers in our analysis because comprehensive bilateral trade data for all nonmem-
bers were not available for the selected commodities. Therefore, our base in the analysis is 
the average trade between a member in the RTA and a nonmember. An ideal base would 
have been the average trade between two nonmembers. The dependent variable in our 
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specification is total bilateral trade. We believe, as do many other analysts, that total trade 
ought not to be used as the dependent variable, as it imposes equality coefficients for im-
ports and exports. Therefore, future research should estimate separate equations for exports 
and imports. Further, we pooled data for the member countries and then fit the same equa-
tion for all countries in the sample. This imposes identical coefficients across countries, and 
that may induce misspecification. As maintained by Egger (2002), traditionally estimated, 
time-averaged, cross-sectional gravity models have the potential to be misspecified because 
they ignore the presence of exporter and importer effects without testing for their relevance. 
Egger (2002) also argues against relying on a cross-sectional framework on the grounds 
that estimated coefficients are a composite of within and between effects. Rather, a panel 
framework is the most appropriate methodology for disentangling time-invariant and coun-
try-specific effects. Future research using panel analysis will certainly enrich our under-
standing of the impacts of RTAs on agrifood trade. 
  
Endnotes 
1. There were widespread RTA initiatives in the 1960s. That period has been called the 
First Regionalism, and more recent attempts to form RTAs have been categorized as 
the Second Regionalism (Bhagwati 1991).  
2. A recent study (2002) by the WTO Secretariat (WT/REG/W/46) shows that existing 
tariffs on industrial products have been eliminated in most cases. Note, however, 
that the most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs on such products were already at low 
levels, especially in industrialized countries. 
3. The Marrakesh Accord, creating the WTO and including the Agreement on Agricul-
ture, was signed in 1994. The Agreement on Agriculture was a significant departure 
from the way agriculture had traditionally been treated in the international trading 
system. New rules and commitments were established in the areas of market access; 
export competition, and domestic support (OECD 1997). 
4. Under NAFTA, all nontariff barriers to agricultural trade, except sanitary and phyto-
sanitary (SPS) measures, between the United States and Mexico were eliminated. In 
addition, many tariffs were eliminated immediately, while others were phased out 
over periods of 5 to 15 years. All agricultural provisions will be implemented by the 
year 2008. For import-sensitive industries, long transition periods and special safe-
guards are allowed under NAFTA. The agricultural provisions of the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement were incorporated into NAFTA. Under these provisions, all 
tariffs affecting agricultural trade between the United States and Canada were re-
moved by January 1, 1998. However, there were a few exceptions for items covered 
by tariff-rate quotas. Mexico and Canada reached a separate bilateral NAFTA 
agreement on market access for agricultural products. The Mexican-Canadian 
agreement eliminated most tariffs either immediately or over 5, 10, or 15 years. Tar-
iffs between the two countries affecting trade in dairy, poultry, eggs, and sugar are 
maintained. NAFTA allows parties to maintain special safeguards in the form of tar-
iff rate quotas on many horticultural goods (Meilke and van Duren 1996).  
5. In the model calibration phase, some parameters are determined based on surveys of 
empirical literature, some are chosen arbitrarily, and the remaining parameters are 
set at values that force the model to replicate the data of a chosen benchmark year 
(Shoven and Whalley 1992). This approach has also been criticized by Diewert and 
Wales (1988). These arbitrary measures undermine the ability of the model to repre-
sent the technology and tastes of the economy under study. Users of the simulation 
results have no way to assess the evidence supporting the choice of most parameters 
values (McKitrick 1998). 
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6. This should be interpreted with care. Note that, in equation (3), the exact income 
elasticity of trade is a3+a5. This implies that a percentage change in Tij is induced by 
a 1 percent change in GDP holding the population constant.  
7. If the estimated coefficient is α1, we can calculate the relative change of expected 
value of total trade (T) for a change of dummy variable from zero to one with the 
following: 11 0 0( ) / 1.T T T e
α− = −  
8. More broadly, we can state that net imports of a NAFTA member from the rest of 
the world is {exp(-α3)-1}*100 percent less relative to its net exports with a non-
member.  
9. One can argue that climate differences in geographical regions would lead countries 
to specialize in different crop production and hence bilateral trade in some agrifood 
products does not depend on distance. However, this is one extreme case.  
10. NAFTA members are Canada, the United States, and Mexico.   
11. As the ITCS database does not provide figures for the bilateral trade of Mexico prior 
to 1990, we got relevant 1985-90 data for Mexico from the United Nations (2004) 
Comtrade database (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/).  
12. A pooled regression is commonplace in the gravity modeling literature. Such regres-
sions are often estimated in cases where there are too few cross-sectional observa-
tions and a fairly good number of time-series observations. The three-year pooling 
follows Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora (2001) and Nilsson (2000). We implicitly assume 
that the regression parameters do not change over time (temporal stability) and that 
they do not differ between various cross-sectional units (cross-sectional stability).  
13. This makes our model similar to Matyas’ (1997) fixed-effects model, although he 
also included time-invariant fixed effects for each individual country.  
14. However, there are deviations. Some coefficients of GDPi on sugar, oilseeds, and 
fruits show a value greater than 1.  
15. Most of the gravity work uses the great-circle distance between the two latitude-
longitude combinations. Similar straight-line measures are used by Linnemann 
(1966) and recently by Frankel (1997) and many others. Frankel distinguishes be-
tween land and sea distances and reports that it made little difference for the results. 
There are a variety of ways to measure transport cost than simply using the distance. 
Geraci and Prewo (1977) use the CIF to FOB ratio while acknowledging serious 
measurement errors.  
16. We follow the procedure used by Frankel (1997) and many others in the literature. 
17. We have not included controlling explanatory variables common border (adjacency) 
and cultural similarities (linguistic links) in the empirical specification. The studies 
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controlling adjacency such as Frankel (1997), and Gilbert, Scollay, and Bora (2001) 
show low coefficients on the log of distance.  
18. We generate dollar-value equivalents of the estimated coefficients of NAFTA and 
NAFTAO by simply multiplying the mean value of the total trade by the percentage 
change. 
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Appendix 
Conceptual Analysis of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
The analysis of the welfare effects of RTAs originated with Viner (1950). Two pos-
sibilities arise when a group of countries forms a union with a common tariff barrier 
against outside countries. One is that higher-cost production within the union may dis-
place lower-cost production in countries outside the union. In effect, world output is re-
duced and some countries outside the union are made worse off. This occurs in the case 
of goods for which the union tariff is greater than the unit money-cost differences be-
tween the union and non-union sources. Second, lower-cost imports from one member 
may displace domestic production in another member country. In this case, world output 
increases, and the union members benefit without any loss to outside countries. Since 
both displacement and diversion can occur simultaneously when many goods are traded, 
one must examine each case in the union individually to determine the predominant ef-
fect on members and on world output (Viner 1950). Moreover, lower internal prices due 
to preferential policy induce an expansion in domestic consumption. 
DeRosa (1998) extends the basic Viner model to a more general case with 
downward-sloping demand and upward-sloping supply functions in country A. The 
model considers two goods—good X and good Y—and three countries—A, B, and C. In 
Figure A.1, country C is assumed to be the most efficient producer of good X. Good X is 
imported by A after levying a specific tariff tA on imports. Similarly, in Figure A.2, 
country A is assumed to be the most efficient producer of good Y. Country B imports 
good Y after levying a specific tariff tB on imports. When a customs union is formed 
between A and B, country A eliminates tariff tA on imports of good X from country B. 
This totally displaces exports of good X from country C to country A and now the entire 
import of X into A is supplied by country B. Table A.1 provides a summary of the welfare 
effects of hypothetical customs union considered in Figure A.1. The diplacement of 
exports from efficient producers in country C by exports from less-efficient producers in 
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B is considered a trade diversion. In Figure A.1, trade diversion resulting from the 
formation of a customs union is equal to the area k. For ease of exposition, the analysis 
here is conducted in terms of values rather than trade volumes. Trade creation 
corresponds to the expansion of country A’s imports of good X, represented by the area 
(e+j+g+l). Trade is created through a production effect (e+j) and a consumption effect 
(g+i). In Figure A.2, the hypothesized customs union has different effects on country B. 
Because country A is the least-cost supplier of good Y, elimination of country B’s tariff 
on imports of good Y from A results solely in trade creation. The expansion of exports of 
good Y from country A to country B leads to displaced production and an increase in 
consumption in country B. Country C neither gains nor loses from trade. Table A.1 
provides a summary of the effects on trade and welfare of the customs union considered 
in Figure A.2.  
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FIGURE A.2. Country B (least-efficient producer of good y) 
 
As emphasized by Viner the trade effects illustrated in Table A.1 are not always 
unambiguous in sign. The customs union results in net trade creation for country B with 
respect to its imports of good Y. Nevertheless the union does not necessarily lead to net 
trade creation for country A with respect to its imports of good X. In general, the 
formation of a customs union results in ambigous net trade effects with respect to trade in 
both goods. These results are reflected in the changes in economic welfare for two 
countries. The economic welfare improves unambiguously for country B due to the 
dominance of consumption and production effects. The changes in economic welfare is 
uncertain for country A as the combined production and consumption effects (area a+b+c 
in Figure A.1) might not be sufficiently large enough to compensate the forgone tariff 
revenue of country A (area b+f). In turn, the changes in economic welfare is ambiguous 
for the customs union. 
These trade and welfare results depend on the assumption illustrated in Figure A.1 
and Figure A.2 regarding the relative efficiency of suppliers in A, B, and C. For country 
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B, the customs union gives rise to entire trade creation and greater welfare effects as 
country A is assumed to be the least-cost supplier of good Y. For country A, the welfare 
effects are uncertain as country B is assumed to be less efficient than country C in 
supplying good X. Generally, in a customs union under constant cost conditions, the 
welfare gain in the home country (A) due to trade creation will be partially, if not fully or 
more than fully, offset by added cost of imports from inefficient partner country (B) and 
forgone tariff revenues. 
Two important implications emerge from the foregoing analysis. In particular, these 
implications are relevant for RTAs, formed among “small” countries (price-takers) 
exibiting constant cost of production. First, if member countries of an RTA are 
predominantly least-cost producers by international standards, the RTA will be trade-
creating on a net basis and will increase welfare unambiguously. Second, if one or more 
member countries are inefficient producers by international standards, the RTA will give 
rise to ambiguous welfare effects. The net welfare effect depends on the positive gains 
resulting from trade creation and tariff revenue losses resulting from trade diversion. 
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TABLE A.1. Trade and welfare effects of a customs union between A and B 
Customs Union 
Area in Figures A.1 and A.2 Sign 
Country A 
Trade effects 
 Trade creation   (e + j) + (g + l)   Positive 
 Trade diversion  k     Positive 
 Net trade effects  (e + j) + (g + l)- k   Uncertain 
Wefare effects 
 Change in economic surplus a + b + c    Positive 
 Production effects  a + e     Positive 
 Consumption effects  c + g     Positive 
Change in tariff revenue  -(b + f)     Negative 
Change in economic welfare  (a + c) - f     Uncertain 
Country B 
Trade effects 
 Trade creation   i + j + l + m    Positive 
 Trade diversion  --     −-  
 Net trade effects  i + j + l + m    Positive 
Welfare effects 
 Change in economic surplus a + b + c + d + e + f + g + h  Positive 
 Production effects  (a + d + e)     Positive 
 Consumption effects  (c + g + h)    Positive 
Change in tariff revenue  -(b + f)     Negative 
Change in economic welfare  (a + d + e) + (c + g + h)  Positive 
Customs Union (A+B) 
Net trade effects   (e + 2j + i) + (g + 2l + m) - k  Uncertain 
Change in tariff revenue  -2(b + f)    Negative 
Change in economic welfare  2(a + c) + ( d + e + g + h) - f  Uncertain 
Note: Welfare effects are measured based on the areas identified in Figure A.1 and A.2. 
